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"IF YOU CAN'T TRUST YOUR LAWYER .... ?"
FREDERICK MILLERt
Of course lawyers lie. Some lawyers. They do it daily in their
pleadings and in their briefs-to their clients and to their colleagues
and to the courts. And, of course, clients lie to their lawyers. Some
clients.
One problem with lawyers lying is that deceit is facially repug-
nant to a system that aspires to find the truth in human conflict and
intercourse. The lawyer's role, both as an advocate and as an officer
of the courts, is critical to achieving that mission and enhancing pub-
lic confidence in the administration ofjustice and the integrity of the
process of law.
How, then, can lawyers lie, or engage in deceit? Very simply,
they should not; but obviously more than a few lawyers do it. One
reason, perhaps, lies in the reality that our justice system is a forum
politic that accommodates, like the diverse society it serves, ambigu-
ity, exaggeration, cleverness, and, on occasion, something less than
the "whole truth and nothing but the truth."
This tolerance to deception is encouraged by the profession's
institutional civility. Seldom is a fig called a fig, or a shyster a shy-
ster. No, our euphemisms are wonderfully polite: "frivolous con-
duct," or a "lack of candor;" or "law-office failure;" or, heaven
forbid, a "peculation," a "defalcation," or a "negative balance" in a
law firms's trust account.
There is also widespread reluctance on the part of lawyers-
again, some lawyers-to discuss publicly, much less acknowledge,
that they have colleagues who engage in deceit and unprofessional
conduct.
This reluctance is magnified when the brand of deceit involves
the theft of client money and property, notwithstanding that most
lawyers would agree that stealing from clients is the ultimate ethical
transgression. For that reason alone, it is appropriate that our Rules
of Professional Responsibility condemn the misuse of clients' money
and property, and impose strict fiduciary obligations on practitioners
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to safeguard and account for client property that comes into their
possession.'
The fact is, however, that theft of client property is not an insig-
nificant or isolated problem within the legal profession. Indeed, it is
a hounding phenomenon nationwide, and probably the principal
reason why most lawyers nationwide are disbarred from the practice
of law.
2
While most of the deceptions cited in Lying to Clients fall short of
classic notions of theft and embezzlement, it is interesting that Pro-
fessor Lerman's catalogue of deceits begins with deceptive billing
practices: running the meter, padding bills, settling clients claims at
a discount to accelerate fees, etc.3 Were the test for billing decep-
tions simply: "Is it good, right, sensible or permitted?," the answer
would be clearly and uniformly, "No."
It is equally unsettling to read that "[n]early all of the lawyers
interviewed reported some amount of deception in practices relating
to billing clients."4 When you consider that most of the lawyers in
I See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1983) (requiring
lawyers to safeguard and segregate client funds and property separately from their
personal and business funds); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-
102 (1981) (requiring lawyers and law firms to deposit client funds into identifiable
bank accounts, into which they may not deposit their own funds except in specified
situations).
2 The American Bar Association's Center for Professional Responsibility, in
responding to my inquiry, reported that 1069 lawyers nationwide were disbarred in
1988. Professional misconduct relating to economic offenses against clients resulted
in 234 disbarments, or 22 per cent of all disbarments. The offenses include
misappropriations (100 disbarments), embezzlement (5), commingling of funds (32),
accounting for funds (23), loans to or from clients (10), illegal fees (2), overreaching,
excessive fee (3), and failure to return fee (59). The category of misconduct cited for
the next largest number of disbarments is general neglect: 100 disbarments. See
generally MODEL STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 5.11 (1986)
("Disbarment is generally appropriate when: (a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal
conduct, a necessary element of which includes . . . misrepresentation, fraud,
extortion, misappropriation, or theft . . . ; or (b) a lawyer engages in any other
intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.").
3 See Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV 659, 705-20 (1990).
4 Id. at 705. Legal fees are not gifts from clients to lawyers. It should be
elemental that they are to be earned in a legal engagement; and that a lawyer is
obligated, as a fiduciary, to provide an honest accounting for their disbursement. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1983); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102(B)(3) (1981). Moreover, the rules proscribe
clearly excessive fees. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (1983);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1981). They also require
lawyers to refund unearned legal fees. See MODE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.16(d) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 2-32, DR 1-110(A)(3) (1981).
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Professor Lerman's survey appear to have been associates or mem-
bers of multi-member law firms, what emerges is hardly a flattering
portrait of the morals of modem legal practice, the efficacy of law
school courses in professional responsibility, or the ideals of our
newer colleagues.
5
The legal profession's traditional response to the misuse of law
clients' property, whether petty or felonious, has been to invoke the
lawyer disciplinary enforcement process, or the criminal justice sys-
tem, or both.
On one level, disbarment is surgically neat and effective: it
excises the offending lawyer from a profession that prides itself on its
reputation for honesty and integrity, it protects the public from
future predations by that individual, and it serves-or should serve-
to deter similar conduct by other members of the bar.
This "washing of the hands" may make the profession feel bet-
ter, but what of the victims of a dishonest and insolvent lawyer? Can
a betrayed client who has lost a lifetime's savings find much solace in
a court order of disbarment, or a lawyer's criminal conviction and
incarceration? Will that client think better of the profession, or of
lawyers, or of a court system that nurtured the lawyer as one of its
officers?
No, and no one with experience in the disciplinary enforcement
process can seriously argue that it was designed to deal with the eco-
nomic consequences of a lawyer's theft. Those who know the pro-
cess also know how devastating-economically and emotionally-
those consequences can be: to clients and honest members of the bar
alike.
Consider, for example, these recent disciplinary episodes involv-
ing former members of the New York bar:
6
5 See Adams, Unlicensed Associates Quit Sullivan, Winthrop, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18, 1989,
at 1, col 3. The LawJournal is conducting a survey of unlicensed lawyers at the thirty
largest law firms in New York State. See Adams, Bar Gropes to Curb Unlicensed Lawyers,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 1989, at 2, col. 4. The survey presents a timely and apt example of
the "slippery slope" of deception:
Faced with the pressure to pile up billable hours, some associates push
aside the tedious task of completing the paperwork necessary to gain
admission. If they fail to keep their firms up to date on their status, some
lawyers suggested, they may find themselves in a position where to
extricate themselves runs a risk of being exposed to a charge that they
practiced without having been admitted.
Id.
6 These episodes involve actual claims presented to the Clients' Security Fund
of the State of New York. Names are omitted to respect client privacy. The examples
used are intended to be representative of the losses presented to Clients' Security
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- Mother routinely cashes child-support checks as an accom-
modation for her divorced daughter. The payee on the checks is her
former son-in-law, who had long ago authorized his former spouse
to supply his endorsement on disability checks paid to him by his
insurer. Then, when a dispute arises over the son-in-law's visitation
rights to the children of the marriage, he complains to his bank that
his endorsements have been forged.
Bank notifies the mother, who calls a prominent local lawyer rec-
ommended by a relative. The lawyer immediately arranges a late-
night conference in his office. He warns his client that she is in
exceedingly deep trouble. He instructs her to transfer the balances
in all her bank accounts into his law firm's client trust account, there
to be protected from attachment by her estranged son-in-law.
The lawyer, scrapped for cash, promptly steals $106,000,
mother's entire wealth. He repays her with numerous checks, all of
which bounce. When his practice collapses shortly thereafter, more
than 100 clients complain of thefts in excess of $5,000,000.
- Another lawyer speculates, privately and successfully, in the
stock market. In violation of federal securities laws, he establishes
two investment funds as an adjunct to his law practice. Upwards of
300 investors subscribe. When the stock market crashes in October
1987, his investment scheme collapses, losing more than $3 million
dollars.
The lawyer attempts to conceal his bad fortune by looting law
clients' trust and estate assets to meet scheduled interest payments
to his investment clients. Thirteen law clients suffer thefts totalling
more than $500,000 when the Securities and Exchange Commission
seizes the lawyer's assets.
- A third lawyer, from a growing suburban county, frequently
lectures local real estate agents about the laws of real property and
professional ethics. Not unexpectedly, he soon develops a thriving
legal practice representing middle-class buyers and sellers of resi-
dential real estate.
He also designs a unique accounting statement for his clients'
transactions. It is so complex and confusing that it will ultimately
require a certified public accountant to establish that the lawyer rou-
Funds nationwide. Although there is no official reporter for determinations by these
funds, the ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct provides digests of court
decisions that deal with ethical issues, including lawyer theft. See, e.g., [Current
Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 235 (Aug. 3, 1988) (summarizing
Clients' Security Fund v. Grandeau, 72 N.Y.2d 72, 526 N.E.2d 270 (1988)).
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tinely shortchanged law clients about $2,000 each on every transac-
tion. (Other clients who successfully decipher their statements
readily excuse the "oversight" when the lawyer refunds their money
and apologizes for the ineptitude of the "girls" in his law office.)
- Another lawyer specializes in negligence and medical mal-
practice litigation. His clients are largely urban poor, the elderly and
minorities. He is retained by a 50-year old client who has been brain
damaged as a result of a physician's malpractice in a municipal hospi-
tal. He repeatedly blames court congestion for delay and inaction in
her proceeding.
In fact, however, the lawyer has already settled her claim with
the hospital's insurer; but at an unconscionable discount in order to
raise cash for himself, apparently to feed his drug addiction. He pro-
vides the defendant hospital with a forged general release from his
client, forges her endorsement on the insurer's settlement draft, and
steals the $67,000 proceeds.
- A successful upstate lawyer is elected a county judge, prohib-
ited by law from engaging in the practice of law. He nonetheless
continues to counsel longstanding clients, sometimes in his court-
house chambers.
One of those clients is elderly, frail and financially comfortable.
From her he takes $100,000 to invest in mortgages for her portfolio.
Instead, the money is diverted to a personal, and failing, business
venture of the judge. He is later removed from the bench, and
resigns from the bar. He publicly promises to make restitution and
then files for bankruptcy.
- A young lawyer in New York City becomes a regular guest on
a popular radio call-in program. She exaggerates her credentials as
an expert matrimonial lawyer, specializing in spousal abuse at cut-
rate prices; but with fees payable in advance. She is unable to cope
with her high-volume practice, but turns no client away. When her
practice collapses and she resigns from the bar, 25 clients find that
their legal files are bare, except receipts for legal fees already paid.
Despite the variety of facts in these examples, they have much in
common with the deceptions in Professor Lerman's survey. In each,
the client is typically unsophisticated. The lawyer exploits the power
and information that flows openly from a client to a fiduciary/lawyer.
The lawyers' deceptions, by commission and omission, are self-serv-
ing in the extreme. The clients' trust in these lawyers is nearly blind
and complete. Also, most of these deceptions occur in private offices
1990]
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and conversations, off the record. Only serendipity and the lawyers'
ineptitude as criminals exposed their dishonesty and deceit.
There are other common threads. These lawyers were all sole
practitioners, 7 unable to afford restitution to avoid disbarment or
criminal prosecution. Contrary to popular belief, malpractice insur-
ance does not protect against lawyer dishonesty or theft;8 and law-
yers who steal rarely, if ever, have bank accounts at Credit Suisse.
Indeed, naked greed is seldom the motivating factor in the theft
of client funds. Typically, lawyers who steal are struggling to main-
tain a marginal practice. They have stolen clients' money several
times over the course of months, or even years. And hope springs
eternal that good fortune will shortly enable these lawyer to restore
shortages in their clients' trust accounts. It is a path down a slippery
slope-robbing Peter to pay Paul, and then robbing Paul and the
remaining apostles.
In the actual arena of disciplinary enforcement, it is rare not to
find concrete factors that contributed to a lawyer's misuse of clients'
money and property. They include the costly economic demands
associated with meeting a law firm's payroll and overhead expenses;
a lawyer's inability to keep abreast of developments in the law; alco-
holism and substance abuse; gambling; marriages on the rocks; per-
sonal and family health problems; and foolhardy speculations by
lawyers in business ventures unrelated to the practice of law.
9
But enough about these dishonest lawyers. What happened to
their clients?
The answer is that the lawyers of New York State reimbursed
7 Most claims seeking reimbursement for theft of client funds in the practice of
law involve solo practitioners in general practice. See New York Client Security Fund,
Annual Report of the Board of Trustees for the Calendar Year 1988, at 18 (1989) (on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter Annual Report].
8 See R. MALLEN &J. SMITH, 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 28.19, at 753 (1989) (legal
malpractice insurance policies typically do not cover " 'any dishonest, fraudulent,
criminal or malicious act or omission of the Insured, any partner or employee' " (case
citations omitted)). But see Clients' Security Fund v. Grandeau, 72 N.Y.2d 62, 526
N.E.2d 270 (1988), in which the court sustained a complaint in malpractice against
the law partner of a dishonest lawyer under a theory of negligence in failing to
prevent the theft of money from the firm's clients. The defendant's malpractice
policy excluded claims arising "out of or in connection with any dishonest,
fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission of any Insured, or any partner,
employee, associate officer, stockholder or member of any Insured, or any other
persons for whose act any Insured is legally liable," but did cover losses arising from
negligent malpractice. The defendant's malpractice insurer ultimately settled the
Fund's claims for awards of reimbursement paid to the law firm's clients. See Annual
Report, supra note 7, at 20.
9 See Annual Report, supra note 7, at 18.
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these victims through the Clients' Security Fund, a special trust cre-
ated by statute and financed by a statewide registration assessment.' 0
There are upwards of 100,000 members of the New York bar, I I
and all but retired lawyers and judges contribute $50 biennially to
finance the administration of the Fund and its program of reimburse-
ment for clients of dishonest lawyers.1
2
It is an active institution: since its creation in 1982, the Fund's
Board of Trustees-five lawyers and two business executives' 3-has
reimbursed upwards of 1500 law clients more than $13,000,000 for
losses caused by dishonest conduct in the practice of law by fewer
than 200 members of the bar. 14
New York State is not alone in this endeavor. There are similar
funds in 49 states and the District of Columbia,' 5 in several com-
mon-law nations, and in the Canadian provinces.16 With few excep-
tions, losses covered by the New York fund would qualify for
reimbursement from security funds in other American
jurisdictions. 7
Regrettably, too few members of the profession-and far fewer
members of the public-know much about these special programs to
protect law clients.' 8 Given their mission to promote public confi-
10 See N.Y. JUD. LAw, § 468-b (McKinney 1989); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW, § 97-t
(McKinney 1989).
11 See Annual Report, supra note 7, at 3.
12 See id. at 13.
13 See id. at 7. The Trustees are appointed by the State Court of Appeals, and
serve without compensation. See N.Y. JUD. LAw § 468-b(1) (McKinney 1989).
14 See New York Clients' Security Fund, Annual Report of the Board of Trustees
for the Calendar Year 1989 (1990) (forthcoming).
15 See Annual Report, supra note 7, at 1.
16 See Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct (ABA/BNA) 45:22002.
17 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR
CLIENT PROTECTION Rule 10 (1989), which states:
C. As used in these Rules, "dishonest conduct" means wrongful acts
committed by a lawyer in the nature of theft or embezzlement of money or
the wrongful taking or conversion of money, property or other things of
value, including but not limited to: (1) Refusal to refund unearned fees
received in advance as required by Rule 1.16 of the Model Rules for
Professional Conduct; and (2) The borrowing of money from a client
without intention to repay it, or with disregard of the lawyer's inability or
reasonably anticipated inability to repay it.
Id
18 The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Lawyers'
Responsibility for Client Protection is attempting to remedy the problem of "secret"
funds, which is really a problem of inadequate financing for funds in most states. In
August 1989, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association approved the
Committee's revision of the 1981 original Model Rules for Clients' Security Funds. The
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dence in the administration of justice and the integrity of the legal
profession, these funds for client reparation and protection repre-
sent one of the legal profession's major reforms in the field of lawyer
discipline, client protection, and public service.1 9
Reform, whether for the courts or the profession, is not a sport
for the shortwinded. Persistence is all, and progress is sometimes
frustratingly slow. Nonetheless, responsible bar leaders and profes-
sionals in the field of professional discipline increasingly recognize
that Lawyers' Funds for Client Protection 2°-the American Bar
Association's recently recommended model name for Clients' Secur-
ity Funds-are essential adjuncts to well-structured and public-spir-
ited lawyer disciplinary enforcement systems.
Law client protection funds bring a fresh perspective to dishon-
est conduct in the practice of law. They serve to monitor the ethical
health of the profession in its most basic commerce with clients.
Their unique day-to-day experience with dishonest conduct in the
practice of law provides bar and judicial leaders with the opportunity
to repair deficiencies in existing disciplinary systems and court rules
which encourage or permit dishonest conduct in the practice of law.
Professor Lerman's proposal for a uniform disciplinary standard
for billing clients2" would eliminate many unnecessary conflicts with
clients, as well as the many opportunities for shady practices that cur-
rently abound. While the proposed standard is probably too
detailed for nationwide application to firms of every size and law
practices of every type, I suspect that legal consumers would find
comprehensive disclosure in this aspect of legal commerce a refresh-
ing breath of fresh air.
22
revised rules propose the standard that the Supreme Court in each state require that
its fund be financed by mandatory and periodic assessments on all practicing lawyers
in the jurisdiction. See MODEL RULES FOR CLIENTS' SECURITY FUNDS Rule 3, Rule 3
comment (1989). The revised Rules also propose that the fund's board of trustees be
required to publicize its activities to the public and the bar. See id. Rule 7 (D), (E);
Rule 17 comment.
19 See Palermo, Clients' Security Funds Help Our Professional Image, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J.,
Oct. 1984, at 10-12; Note, Attorney Misappropriation of Clients' Funds: A Study in
Professional Responsibility, 10 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 415, 423-32 (1977); Note, Pennsylvania
Clients' Security Fund - How Secure is the Public?, 22 VILL. L. REV. 452, 452-68 (1977).
20 See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION (Preamble)
(1989).
21 See Lerman, supra note 3, at 750-52.
22 Any new rule on billing practices should address two other unsettled and
nettlesome ethical problems: how lawyers account for legal fees paid in advance, see
Brickman, The Advance Legal Fee Payment Dilemma: Should Payments be Deposited to the
Client Trust Account or to the General Office Account?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1989); and
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The legal profession works effectively only in an atmosphere
where clients extend full trust to its practitioners. The breach of that
trust by even one lawyer fouls the environment for every member of
the profession and, of course, its collective and historic reputation
for honesty and integrity in dealing with client money and property.
Yes, some lawyers lie, cheat and deceive their clients. But they
are the exception, and an embarrassment to most lawyers. That is
good news. But so too is the fact that lawyers individually, and the
bar collectively, have the professional obligation 23 to participate in
reimbursement programs for clients who have lost money or prop-
erty as a result of a colleague's dishonest conduct, whether it be
called deceit, conversion, embezzlement, or theft.
the propriety of so-called "nonrefundable retainers." See, e.g., Jacobson v. Sassower,
66 N.Y.2d 991, 489 N.E.2d 1283 (1985).
23 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 comment (1983);
MODEL RULES FOR LAWYERS' FUNDS FOR CLIENT PROTECTION Rule I(B) (1989).

